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Trusts and governments
by Andrew Edwards
In a recent address to the International Bar Association Andrew 
Edwards, formerly a Director and Deputy Secretary at HM Treasury 
and author of the Edwards Report on Financial Regulation in the Crown 
Dependencies, highlighted the need for regulation of the trusts sector, 
modernisation of legal frameworks, international standards and an 
inter-governmental forum. He called on the government to take the 
lead, in co-operation with legal professionals and practitioners. The 
following article is a lightly edited version of his address.
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INTRODUCTION
May I say first what a tremendous honour it is to be here this 
evening. Thank you for inviting me.
You've kindly asked me to offer you some thoughts on trusts 
and governments. This is a subject in which I became keenly 
interested when reviewing financial regulation in the Crown 
Dependencies for Jack Straw, Home Secretary, in 1998.
I'm not a lawyer. But the trust sector involves public policy as 
well as law. And I've received much help from some leading 
authorities on trust law, David Hayton, Christopher McCall, 
John Mowbray and Donovan Waters, and from some leading 
authorities on related matters, Michael Blair and Andrew Lewis 
(UCL). I do thank them all. But please don't imagine that they 
would necessarilyIshare my views.
I'd like to address four questions, all rather elementary:
  How important is the trust sector?
  Is all well in the sector?
  If not, what needs to be done?
  Who needs to do it?
HOW IMPORTANT IS THE TRUST SECTOR?
First, then, how important is the trust sector?
I've no doubt it's very important indeed. Trusts must, I 
believe, be among the most ingenious and remarkable 
instruments ever devised by the wit of man.
The explicit separation in express trusts of beneficial from legal 
ownership of assets facilitates neat solutions to all manner of 
otherwise intractable problems, especially for testators, donors 
and charities, and increasingly tor the financial and commercial 
sectors as well.
And constructive trusts enable the law to resolve otherwise 
intractable problems w ith sense and equity by analog even where 
no express trust has been formed.
Important as the trust sector is already, I think its importance 
will increase. The sector's potential for growth seems 
considerable. This for several reasons.
First, many people living in jurisdictions without trust 
facilities would doubtless find them invaluable: not least, 
perhaps, those who live in countries with rigid inheritance laws. 
So we're likely, I believe, to see more trust jurisdictions, and 
more people making use of trust facilities in other jurisdictions. 
The recent growth of South American trusts in the Caribbean 
centres has, for example, been remarkable.
Second, there seems much scope for developing the old trust 
forms and inventing new ones in ways that will further enhance 
the value of trust instruments and the demand for them.
Third, the commercial applications of trusts have burgeoned 
in recent years and will, I believe, continue to do so. Trust 
instruments give the City of London a considerable advantage 
compared with non-trust centres. Commercial applications now 
include not only the familiar pension fund, unit trust, 
bankruptcy and sinking fund applications, but also trusts tor 
purposes such as: employee share ownership, bondholders, loan 
note issues, nominee shareholdings, securitisation, client 
accounts, future income streams, subordinated creditors, and 
retention funds.
Like other financial instruments, however, trusts can also be 
vehicles for abuse. That's a further, less welcome, reason why 
they're important.
We all know what the potential abuses are. There are two 
main categories:
(1) Settlor abuses. Trust arrangements may be designed to 
deceive. They may be spurious or double-mirrored. They 
mav be used to hide or disguise assets, to protect assets 
from creditors and others with a right to them, to evade 
taxes, to frustrate other due processes of law, to shelter the 
proceeds of crime.
(2) Trustee abuses. Trustees mav aid and abet settlors in the 
abuses just mentioned. In addition, they may fail in their 
duties towards settlors and beneficiaries. They mav fail to 
carry out the terms of the trust deed. They may be 
incompetent in conducting the trust's business, including 
investment. They may be negligent. They may charge- 
unreasonable fees. They mav even steal the assets.
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Such abuses, it they became widespread, could all too easily 
bring the whole trust sector into disrepute. The continuing use 
of these remarkable instruments could be put at risk.
IS ALL WELL IN THE SECTOR?
So we come to my second question: is all well in the sector?
The answer has, 1 believe, to be: No, not quite. There are, I 
suggest, three jup^fantice problems. First, the trust sector has 
remained substantially unre^u/ated at a time when all other 
financial institutions, and even companies to some extent, have 
been regulated. There's no external regulation of professional 
trustees, except for any investment business they may undertake. 
And there's not much self-regulation either. Anyone can set up 
in business as a professional trustee. There's no requirement to 
be fit and proper, competent, free of conflicts of interest, 
properly organised to combat crime, or anything else. Mainly as 
a result of this, the scope for abuses of the kind we just 
mentioned, by settlors and trustees alike, remains considerable, 
more so perhaps than in any other part of the financial sector.
Second, the potential of the trust sector risks being increasing* 
unrea/ijeJ. The ancient framework of the common law, 
miraculously good and miraculously relevant as much of it is, 
can't readily handle the challenges of modernisation and 
development. Judge-driven, case-driven law simply can't cope 
on its own, in my opinion, with the demands of the 2 1st century 
or the new and changing requirements of persons, companies 
and financial institutions.
That is not to criticise the judges. On the contrary, judges have 
done a remarkable job over the centuries in developing the law 
of trusts. The point is rather that we can't expect judges to do a 
job they're not employed to do. The critics would castigate them 
if they did.
The problem lies not with judges but with governments. 
Governments in the old trust jurisdictions have done little to 
modernise, develop, or otherwise reform the trust sector. 
Instead, the offshore centres, notably the Caribbean, are making 
the running.
Third, there is /iff/e international co-operation on trust matters 
between the authorities in trust jurisdictions. And there are no 
international standard's.
Corresponding to these substantive problems, there are two 
problems
First, in the UK at least and I suspect in the other old trust 
jurisdictions too, no one inside the government accepts 
responsibility for oversight, sponsorship or regulation of the 
trust sector. There is a vacuum of authority.
Second, there is no international inter-^ocemmenta/ jorum of 
trust jurisdictions for the discussion of international standards 
and co-operation.
In all the respects I've mentioned, the contrast between trusts 
and other parts of the financial sector, such as banking, 
investment and insurance, could hardly be greater.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?
So we come to my third and main question: what needs to be 
done?
In my opinion the sector needs a judicious combination of 
regulation, modernisation and international standards. It needs 
above all to join fne rest oj fAc jinancia/ sector
To elaborate this a little, I would see three main elements in 
the substantive reform agenda, all corresponding to what happens 
elsewhere in the financial sector:
(a) re^u/ation of professional providers of trust services 
providers, including modern systems for customer 
protection and combating crime and money laundering;
(b) modernisation and* Jeye/opmenf of the sector through 
legislation to facilitate new trust forms, codification and 
improvement of existing forms, and removal of present 
imperfections and anomalies; and
(c) development of international standards and co-operation.
(a) Re^u/adon o^ fru*f jeryices providers
Taking these in order, there seems to me a compelling case for 
reau/afina professional providers of trust services, both to protect 
customers and to combat crime.
With regard to customer protection, professional trustees and 
other providers of trust services should be obliged to serve their 
customers in a professional way. They should be licensed as 
being fit, proper and competent. They should undergo 
professional development training on a continuing basis. 
Management structures should be in place to make abuses as 
difficult as possible. Conflicts of interest should be scrupulously 
avoided. The four-eyes or six-eyes principle should be 
scrupulously observed. There should be proper accountability 
and accounts, procedures to deal with vacuums of accountability, 
and a methodology for restraining fees.
We should in short have the same expectations and 
requirements of those who offer professional trust services as we 
have of those who offer banking, investment and insurance 
services."^
With regard to combating crime, professional trustees, like 
others in the finance sector, have a duty towards society as well 
as their customers. They should not aid or abet their customers 
in laundering the proceeds of crime or in other criminal 
activities but should play a full part in the new regimes for 
combating money laundering. They should know their customer, 
including the beneficial owner and provenance of the assets to be 
settled or added. They should co-operate with the regulatory 
and law enforcement authorities in providing information, 
assisting investigations, obtaining evidence, restraining assets, 
and confidential reporting of suspicions to the law enforcement 
authorities.
In the UK, these principles mostly apply already, in theory at 
least, to the trust sector just like everyone else in the country.
But making them work in practice depends, in this as in other 
parts of the financial sector, on enforcement. And enforcement in 
turn depends on the existence of a re^u/atory regime: a regime 
where the regulator requires regulated bodies to have modern 
systems in place for combating money laundering and other 
forms of crime. In the absence of such systems, there is no way 
that regimes to combat money laundering will work. ^
So that's another reason why it seems to me essential to 
regulate providers of trust services.
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In practice, the forthcoming Financial Services and Markets 
Act will give the Treasury wide powers to extend regulation into 
new areas. And the secondary legislation now proposed 
envisages that regulation should in principle cover all who have 
discretionary management of funds belonging to another. So 
there may be an clement of preaching to the converted in this 
part of the reform agenda.
But the new texts aren't explicit. And the intention seems to 
be that many trustees would be exempted from regulation even 
for discretionarv fund management.v O
So maybe the authorities Amen 't been converted after all. At 
the very least, the draft exemptions will need to be reconsidered.
It seems to me essential that regulation should cover trust 
services, not implicitly and partially, but expAcit/y und 
compreAemirc/y.
It should be clear that u// professional providers of trust 
services are covered. Regulating some but not others would be 
wrong in principle and troublesome in practice.
It should likewise be clear that regulation will cover a/7 tAe 
ierWcei they provide: not just discretionary management of 
others' funds but all the other fiduciary and professional services 
as well, such as guarding and distributing the assets.
If the government will only proceed as I'm suggesting (which 
would I may say be somewhat unusual), we shall be following 
some well-established offshore precedents. The Channel Islands 
and the Isle of Man, for example, are all poised to implement 
legislation and regulatory regimes for professional providers of 
trust and company services. And incidentally, if they introduce 
these regimes successfully, they'll put the bad providers there out 
of business. And many of the bad providers will shift their 
practices to less well-regulated jurisdictions, including the old 
trust jurisdictions if we persist in having no regulation.
Modernisation and (rujf
The second main item of agenda is to modernise and develop 
the sector through legislation to facilitate new trust forms, 
codification and improvement where necessary of existing 
forms, and removal of present imperfections and anomalies.
As we saw earlier, the trust sector is probably not realising its 
potential. No one in the old jurisdictions is modernising or 
developing the sector so as to meet the expanding and changing 
needs of persons, families, commerce, charities and other 
purposes, world-wide, in an age of electronics with minimal 
exchange controls. We're leaving others to make the running, 
particularly offshore centres.
With regard to new trust Jonm, I suspect there is much scope for 
developing and modernising trust forms for commercial uses.
There may also be a case for a more constructive, but still 
cautious, approach to purpose trusts. Is the law in England right, I 
wonder, to frown so heavily on trusts set up for purposes 
analogous to charity which the Chanties legislation does not 
recognise as charitable? Was it right in 1957 to strike downo o
Bernard Shaw's two trusts for the reform of English spelling?^
At the very least there seems to me to be an issue here. Judges 
and QCs can't make such a reform. So it has to be an issue for 
public policy.
If the law sAouA/ be amended to allow non-charitable purpose 
trusts in certain circumstances, there would need I think to be 
certain conditions:
(i) Such trusts would preferably be registered", perhaps by an 
extended Charity Commission, in much the same way as 
chanties
(ii) There would need always to be an Enjorcer, so that such 
trusts do not become 'black holes' with trustees 
accountable to no one. Perhaps the Charity Commissioners 
or an Office reporting to the Law Officers should appoint 
or approve Enforcers and act as Enforcer of last resort. And 
certainlv others with an interest should be able to enforce 
against the Enforcer.
(iii) The trusts concerned (or their settlors) would need to 
jmance the regulation and enforcement themselves. As with 
the licensing and regulation of trustees, so too here there 
is no case for financing from public funds.
(iv) There is of course no reason why such trusts should receive 
tax relief. That's a matter for the Chancellor to propose and 
Parliament to decide.
The removal of imperfections, anomaAcs and" oAscun'fies in the 
present legal regimes for trusts is again likely to require 
legislation, including some codification of existing case law.
In any trust regime there needs to be absolute clarity that 
trusts, like other parts of the financial services sector, may not 
be used to violate accepted standards of international behaviour.
This is largely a matter for the statutory schemes of regulation 
we discussed a moment ago. There are also, however, someo
issues peculiar to trust instruments which the codified law ought 
preferably, in my view; to tackle specifically.
In the area of sett/or aAuses, the law in all trust jurisdictions needs 
preferably to establish two principles as explicitly as possible:
» First, trusts mm* not 6e used" fo^rustrate d"ue processes o^/aw, law 
enforcement or regulation, for example by conceaAna or 
d"is^uisin^ assets or giving them special protection against 
creditors and others with a right to them; and
* Second, settlors may not contro/ trusts while pretending not to, in 
particular by setting up 'sham' or spurious arrangements 
which misrepresent the real position. Honesty and 
transparency are as vital in trusts as in other areas.
If I'm not mistaken, the law of England goes a long way 
towards enshrining these key principles already But there are 
other trust jurisdictions where the principles seem not to apply
And it would anyway, I believe, be best if in a/7 trust 
jurisdictions these principles could be explicitly codified in 
statute.
At a more technical level, the law in all jurisdictions should 
explicitly confirm the rights of judgment creditor; to information 
about trusts and trust assets.
From this point of view, and in the wider interests of 
transparency, there's a case, at least, for requiring conyia'entia/ 
registration of trusts with the authorities as well. But governments 
are unlikely to contemplate this further step until a later stage in 
the reform agenda, when we have international standards.o 25
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In the area of trustee abuses, there seems to me a strong case tor' o
a codified law to establish explicitly that:
  professional trustees must be licensed and regulated;
  sole trustees, other than licensed trust companies, are not 
permitted;
  trustees must always be accountable to someone genuinely 
able to oversee what they do;^
  trustees must within reason keep beneficiaries and objects of 
a power informed;
  thev may not exempt themselves from liability for negligence;
» V * v O C* *
" they may not seek to escape justice by invoking the privilege 
against self-incrimination. (Why Jo the laws of Europe and 
America continue to grant this long outdated privilege?)
On the subject of anoma/ies, the rules for tracing and imputing 
assets ought preferably, I suggest, to reflect a more conventional 
view of algebra.
Lastly the trust frameworks in all jurisdictions include 
^ufur« such as the length of perpetuity periods and limitation (or 
'hardening') periods. These may or may not be nicely judged. 
But they would better, I believe, be decided as matters of public 
policy, and then codified in statute.
These then are some of the issues that could usefully in my 
opinion be addressed in the context of developing and 
modernising the trust sector. I don't want to suggest that the 
solution in all cases lies in revisions to trust law. In some cases, 
solutions would better be sought in other areas of the law, such 
as criminal justice and insolvency, or in Codes of Conduct 
forming part of the regulatory process. But revisions to trust law, 
and codification of some parts of the existing law, will be key 
elements in the programme and will be all the more necessary as 
we move towards international standards.
(r) JnfernaffonaY jfandards and co-o/)grafAm
So we come to the third and final element of our agenda: 
international standards and co-operation.
The world's banking, securities, investment and insurance 
regulators have come together in recent years to define 
international standards for each of the industries concerned, 
including prudential and conduct of business aspects, and to 
promote international co-operation.
In the trust sector, this has not happened. But the 
requirement for an international inter-governmental forum of 
trust jurisdictions is equally great.
Without international standards, suitably enforced, there 
tends to be competition between jurisdictions in looseness of 
standards: the proverbial 'race to the bottom'.
Sadly to say, I believe we can see signs of such a race in the trust 
sector today. Some of the small jurisdictions, in particular, are 
clearly looking for extra business from would-be settlors who wish 
to do any of a number of borderline or less than reputable things.
As with schools examination boards, so with trust regimes, the 
temptation to gain business by indulging the customer mav be 
very strong.
In a civilised world, there should I believe be i 
tA for trusts in areas such as:
" Legal frameworks
* Establishment of trusts subject to the laws of other countries
* judicial capabilities
* Regulatory standards and codes of conduct
" Transparency to law enforcement and regulatory authorities
» Co-operation with the same authorities
* Transparency to interested parties
* Professional resources and qualifications 
» Settlor control of trusts
* Spurious trusts
* Non-ohstruction of due processes of law
* Accountability of trustees
* Perpetuity periods
* Limitation periods
* Flee clauses
» Wind-up provisions
* Charitable and purpose trusts
» Recognition by non-trust jurisdictions
* Co-operation between jurisdictions.
Some of these matters have an increased urgency in the new 
globalised world, not least the practice of writing trusts subject 
to the law of some foreign jurisdiction, flee clauses and 
recognition of the trust laws of other jurisdictions.
The governments and regulators of trust jurisdictions ought 
preferably to meet regularly to develop standards in these and 
the other areas and to promote international co-operation.
WHO NEEDS TO DO IT?
All that was about what needs to be done. So now we come to 
the final question: who needs to do it?
In my opinion, the short answer has to be that fAc ^mcmmmf 
must do it, in close co-operation of course with the professionals 
and practitioners. Why so? Because only the government is able to 
deliver the agenda we just discussed. Only the government is able:
* to introduce an explicit reuu/afory regime for professional trust 
service providers;
» to decide a national policy for moJcrnnm^ the trust sector, 
through the development of new forms and resolution of 
existing problems, and then to promote the necessary 
legislation and implementation; and
» to promote establishment of an international mfcr-^otcmmcnra/ 
Jorum on trust matters.
It's no part of my purpose to castigate the UK government for 
past inaction. In the wider area of financial regulation, the 
government has been exceptionally active.
I Jo think, however, that the government needs to tackle the 
governance problem I mentioned earlier: the vacuum of authority 
and responsibility for trust matters inside the government. It 
needs to identify who inside government is to be responsible for 
oversight, sponsorship and regulation of the trust sector and to 
set up some standing inter-departmental machinery.
In my opinion:
* The Treasury, with its new responsibility for Financial 
Regulation generally, needs to be responsible, in consultation
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with the Financial Services Authority, for regulation of the 
sector.
  The Financial Services Authority needs to implement the 
regulation.
  The Lord Chancellor's Department or the Home Office need 
to lead on development of the trust law.
  And one department, probably the Cabinet Office, should 
chair a standing inter-departmental committee ot these and 
other departments (including the Inland Revenue and DTI) 
for bringing the strands together and promoting an 
international inter-povernmental forum for internationalo
standards and co-operation in trust matters.
Some may object that the government itself is hamstrung: that 
constraints on the government's Ye^is/unon programme; in 
Parliament will make this whole agenda for trust reform 
impracticable.
For myself, I wouldn't be so pessimistic. As Bismarck said, 
there's no need to commit suicide for fear of death.
Parliamentary time constraints are the easiest and most 
common of all excuses for inaction.
But such constraints don't, in my opinion, pose any threat to 
the regu/adon of trust services providers. The new Financial 
Services and Markets Act will give the Treasury wide powers to 
extend FSA regulation to new areas through secondary legislation. 
And the secondary legislation already proposed could readily, I 
suspect, be adapted so as explicitly to cover trust services 
providers. If there is anything in the primary or secondary 
legislation that prevents this, it should I suggest be promptly 
changed. More serious, perhaps, are the threats to the project to 
modernise and" coa*j^y (Ac A^a/ yramewor^ of trusts. That clearly nou/d 
require primary legislation. But this project too is far from being 
a lost cause. Governments Jo find time to do what's important. 
It's mainly a matter of persuasion. And the City, the lawyers and 
the practitioners between them, if they have the will, could do 
much to promote the cause.
EPILOGUE
In all my remarks this evening I've assumed that, just as war is 
too important to be left to military men, so the trust sector is 
too important to be left to lawyers a/one.
If this assumption has offended you, I ask for forgiveness.
In the hope of mitigation, I admitted at the outset I was not a 
lawyer.
In conclusion, I ask that one more offence be taken into 
consideration. I believe the problems of company regulation to be 
es more scnou.s than those of trust regulation.
But that's for another evening!
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This text is an edited version of an address delivered at the closing 
dinner of the 6th International Wealth Transfer Practice Conference 
of the International Bar Association, London, on 14 March 2000.
* Origins of trusts Trusts arc an enduring monument from the 1 5th 
century. Unlike the monasteries, the) survived the assaults of Thomas 
Cromwell in the 1530s.
case for licensing and regulation of trust services
providers Compelling as the case lor licensing and regulation appears 
to he, government sources have traditionally questioned the need to 
look after the rich lew, whether settlors or beneficiaries, who have 
trusts, and in particular to spend puhlic resources on such a purpose.
This al\vavs seemed to me wrong, lor three reasons. Kirst, the country 
cannot aftord to let anything happen in one of the most valuable services 
offered by the City of London, among others. Reputation is a habile thing. 
And that's how reputations are lost. Second, trusts do not involve only the 
rich tew Directly or indirectly a high percentage of the population must 
now have some dependence on trusts, personal, commercial or charitable. 
Third, on the point about puhlic resources, regulation ol providers ol trust 
services should not be a drain on public finances but should be financed 
from licence fees of the regulated population.
Suspicion reports The 14/? thousand suspicion reports filed by 
the UK's finance industry in 1999 included one report by a company 
formation a^ent and none bv professional trustees (though the reports 
bv banks and others could include some trust cases).
^Bernard Shaw Trusts Shaw himself recognised the risk of 
protracted litigation culminating in the kind of verdict that Mr Justice 
Harman later delivered. 'My ghost', he wrote, 'will be perfectly 
satisfied if the lawyers and litigants keep the subject in the headlines 
tor the twenty years perpetuity limit.' See Michael Holrovd's 
biography; final section.
Pros and cons of registration of trusts A scheme lor registration 
ol trusts would preferably oblige trustees to report in confidence to 
the authorities in standard format: the true identities of the ultimate 
settlor and beneficiaries, the trustees, the custodians, protectors and 
enforcers, if any, a copy of the Trust Deed, some basic information 
about the trust assets, including provenance, and anv significant
* O 1 ' . vT"
changes subsequently.
The database the authorities would have under such a scheme would Ix? 
helplul in: (a) combating the abuse of trust instruments (or crime and 
monev laundering, (b) making it more difficult for settlors or 
Ix-neficiaries to conceal assets and income from others with claims on 
them, (c) monitoring trust service providers, and (d) monitoring in 
statistical terms the development of the trust sector.
The main arguments against registration are: (a) privacy should not be 
lightly set aside, (b) bureaucracy should not he lightly multiplied, and 
(c) compliance costs should not lightly be im|X)sed on regulated 
populations. However, the privacy argument loses much force if 
disclosure is to the authorities only. The bureaucratic costs would 
likewise be reduced by technology and the easier monitoring ol service 
providers. And compliance costs would be minimal unless the service 
providers would otherwise fail to conduct due diligence (in which case 
the costs would be well justified).
A more important consideration in practice, |x*rhaps, for individual 
governments is that a unilateral requirement for registration of trusts 
would risk major losses of business to other trust centres. That is why 
registration, if intnxluced, should preferably be in the context of an 
international standard.
^Solving deficiencies of accountability A particular problem for 
accountability is how to ensure that someone impartial but competent 
represents the interests of those who cannot represent themselves: those 
not yet born, minors, mental patients and those not yet ascertained.
The solution to this may lie in two parts. Hirst, all trustees should (as 
suggested in the main text) be obliged to ensure that they are 
accountable to someone genuinely able to vet what they do. Second, a 
body such as the Official Solicitor should preferably be prepared, at 
the trust's expense, to appoint representatives or litigation friends for 
those who cannot represent themselves; or in the last resort to act in 
these roles themselves.
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